Mill on the Logical Structure of Causal Theories
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Author: Fred WilsonFred Wilson
Affiliation: University of TorontoUniversity of Toronto
Source: Causation 1500-2000
Keywords: causation, science, history, Mill
Synopsis
It has become customary to argue that there is no one method to science, there are many different methods. John Stuart Mill thought otherwise. I propose to argue that Mill’s case is not without merit. I examine Mill’s account of explanation in science and his account of the logical structure of casual theories and their role in scientific research. I then go on to show how this view of causal theories enables one to make sense of two widely different cases, the Newtonian synthesis and the Freudian synthesis. This is not a broad sample, but the fact that Mill’s account of science can deal with these two very different theories goes some way, I suggest, to justifying the claim that science has in it a common method, and justifying moreover that claim that Mill has in broad outline at least described that method and showed it provided a set of norms conformity to which is conducive to the discovery, within our fallible limits, of matter-of-fact truth.
