From Contextualism to Contrastivism
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Create volume indexCategory:Contents of Philosophical Studies/119 | Works by this author |
Author: Jonathan Schaffer
Source: Philosophical Studies,
vol. 119Category:Philosophical Studies/volume 119, 2004, pp. 73–103
Web link: www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2004/00000119/F0020001/05151722
Keywords: epistemology, contrastivism, contextualism, knowledge
@article{schaffer2004f,
author = "Schaffer, Jonathan",
title = {From Contextualism to Contrastivism},
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
volume = "119",
year = "2004",
pages = "73--103"}
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Synopsis
Jonathan Schaffer argues for his own alternative to contextualism, which he calls ‘contrastivism’. This is the view that knowledge attributions have a ternary structure of the form S knows that p rather than q.


